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This paper is devoted to the study of claims problems. We identify the family of rules
that satisfy strong composition down (robustness with respect to reevaluations of the estate)
and consistency (robustness with respect to changes in the set of agents) together. Such
a family is the ﬁxed path rules, which is a generalization of the weighted constrained equal
awards rules. In addition, once strong composition down and consistency are combined with
homogeneity only the weighted constrained equal awards rules survive. We also prove that
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21 Introduction
How to adjudicate conﬂicting demands is a very old question, which was ﬁrstly model by O’Neill
(1982). This class of claims problems refers to all situations in which a given quantity of a
commodity has to be distributed among some agents when the available resource falls short of
the total demand. The canonical illustration is the allotment of liquidation value of bankrupt
ﬁrm among its creditors. The reader is referred to Thomson (2003) for a wide exposition of the
literature.
Any claims problem is determined by three elements, a set of agents, an available amount of
resource, called estate, and a vector of demands or claims. A rule is a way of distributing
the available estate among the agents according to their claims. In this work, we follow the
axiomatic approach, justifying the rules in terms of the properties they satisfy. These properties
usually refer to notions of equity and stability.
One of the most widely studied rules is the so-called constrained equal awards rule (Maimonides,
12th Century). It proposes that all individuals should be treated uniformly, subject to no one
receives more that her claim. This implies that, for any claims vector, all the agents who do
not get their claim receive equal amounts, independently of how small or large the estate is. A
generalization of this idea underlies the weighted constrained equal awards rules. The objective
is to favor agents who are perceived as more deserving. For a given vector of positive weights,
and for any claims vector, for the corresponding weighted constrained equal awards rule, all
the agents who do not get their claim receive amounts that, when divided by their respective
weights, are equal, independently of how small or large the estate is. We consider here a further
extension: the ﬁxed path rules.1 The rules in the ﬁxed-path family respect the spirit of the two
aforementioned rules. But, unlike them, for any claims vector, all the agents that do not get
their claim receive an amount that does depend on how small or large the estate is.
Among the procedural properties normally required, composition down (Moulin (2000)) emerges
as a useful requirement. Imagine that, when estimating the value of the estate, we were too
optimistic, and the actual value is smaller than expected. Now, two alternatives are open.
Either we solve the new problem. Or we consider a problem in which the estate is the small
one, and the claims are the allocations obtained with the overestimated estate. Composition
down requires the ﬁnal allocation to be independent of the chosen alternative. In this property
it is implicitly assumed that, either all agents unanimously demand the original claims, or all
agents unanimously demand the awards for the overestimated estate. We propose here to revise
such an assumption, and to consider the possibility that some agents demand their original
claims while the others demand their adjusted claims. Again, two alternatives appear: either
to solve the problem under the new claims vector, or directly. If the ﬁnal allocation is always
independent of the chosen alternative, we say that our rule satisﬁes strong composition down.
1These rules were ﬁrstly introduced by Moulin (1999) in the context of resource allocation with single-peaked
preferences. We adapt them to claims problem keeping the same name.
3This new property states that agents will not beneﬁt from insisting on their initial claims when
others accept the reduction given by the tentative awards corresponding to the overestimated
estate.
We also consider a property that provides robustness with respect to changes in the set of agents.
Consistency refers to a situation in which a tentative distribution of the estate has been made,
and an agent leaves after accepting her award. It states that the reduced problem should be
solved in such a way that all remaining agents are allotted exactly the same amount as they
were originally.
Our main result says that the only solutions satisfying strong composition down and consistency
together are the ﬁxed path rules. Moulin (2000) characterizes the rules fulﬁlling composition
down, composition up, homogeneity, and consistency. This family of rules (called M family)
is extremely wide. Interestingly, once we strengthen composition down to strong composition
down in Moulin’s assumptions we separate the weighted constrained equal awards rules from all
the others in the family M.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we set up the model and we present
the ﬁxed path family. In Section 3 we introduce strong composition down and we present our
main result. In Section 4 we explore other properties the ﬁxed path rules fulﬁll, and we provide
alternative characterizations of the weighted constrained equal awards and the constrained equal
awards rules. In Section 5 we conclude with some ﬁnal comments and remarks. The proofs are
relegated to an appendix.
2 Statement of the model. The ﬁxed-path rules
Let N be the set of all potential agents. Let N denote the family of all ﬁnite subsets of N. Let
γ ∈ R be an upper bound on the agents’ demand.2 In a claims problem, or simply a problem,
a ﬁxed amount E ∈ R++, called estate, has to be distributed among a group of agents N ∈ N
according to their claims (represented by c = (ci)i∈N ∈ [0,γ]N), when E is not enough to fully
satisfy all the claims. Therefore, a problem is a triple e = (N,E,c) where
P
i∈N ci ≥ E and
ci ≤ γ for all i ∈ N. We denote by CN the class of claims problems with ﬁxed population N,
and by C the class of all claims problems, namely
CN =
(










2This upper bound is not usual in the claims problems literature. But it makes the presentation simple and
the proofs much more illustrative. However, all the results and considerations in this paper remain unchanged
without this assumption.
4An awards vector for e ∈ C is a division of the estate among the agents, that is, it is a list
x ∈ RN
+ such that: (a) Each agent receives a non-negative amount which is not larger than her
claim (for each i ∈ N, 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci); and (b) the estate is exactly distributed (
P
i∈N xi = E).
Let X(e) be the set of all awards vectors for e ∈ C. A rule is a way of selecting awards vectors,
that is, it is a function, S : C −→
S
e∈C X(e), that selects, for each problem e ∈ C, a unique
awards vector S(e) ∈ X(e).
Let S be a rule and let c be a ﬁxed claims vector, pS(c) is the path followed by S(E,c) as the
estate E varies from 0 to C. The path pS(c) is called path of awards of S for c. Any rule
can be deﬁned by the collection of its paths of awards for the diﬀerent claims vectors.
The following are two of the most prominent rules in the literature. Each of them corresponds to
diﬀerent ideas of fairness in the distribution of the estate. The ﬁrst one follows the Aristotelian
notion of justice, and proposes a distribution of the estate proportional to the claims.
Proportional rule, p: For each e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector pi(e) = λ   ci for
some λ ∈ R+ such that
P
i∈N λ   ci = E.
The second comes from Maimonides (12th Century). It says that agents should be treated
equally, independently of their diﬀerences in claims. Thus, the so-called constrained equal awards
rule proposes equality in gains, adjusting, if necessary, to ensure that no agent receives more
than her claim.
Constrained equal awards rule, cea: For each e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector
ceai(e) = min{ci,λ} for some λ ∈ R+ such that
P
i∈N min{ci,λ} = E.
Now we consider a family of rules, the so-called weighted constrained equal awards rules. As
their name suggests, they are a generalization of the constrained equal awards rule. In the cea
rule, agents’ claims are fully comparable. But it may happen that diﬀerences in agents’ needs
ask for some adjustments. This can be done by mean of a vector of weights. For each i ∈ N, let
αi ∈ R++ be claimant i’s weight, and α = (αi)i∈N the vector of weights. These weights reﬂect
how deserving each agent is.
Weighted constrained equal awards rule with weights α = (αi)i∈N, ceaα: For each
e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector ceaα
i (e) = min{ci,αiλ} for some λ ∈ R+ such that
P
i∈N min{ci,αi   λ} = E.
It is quite obvious that the constrained equal awards rule is the particular weighted constrained
equal awards rule in which all the agents have the same weight.
Figure 1 illustrates the three aforementioned rules by showing the paths of awards for several
claim vectors.



























Figure 1: Path of awards for diﬀerent claims vectors in two-agent problems. (a)
Proportional rule. (b) Constrained equal awards rule. (c) Weighted constrained
equal awards rule for α = (2,1). Γ denotes the claim vector whose components are
all equal to γ, Γ = (γ,...,γ).
Next we present the ﬁxed path rules. These solutions were ﬁrstly introduced by Moulin (1999)
in the context of resource allocation with single-peaked preferences. We adapt them to claims
problem. Let us focus for a while on the two-agent framework, N = {i,j}. The typical path
of awards of a ﬁxed path rule is described as follows. There is a main ray from the origin to
Γ (that will be the ﬁxed path), and vertical and horizontal rays emanating from the ﬁxed path
and ending at the claims vector. Therefore, as Figure 1 shows, the cea and cea(2,1) rules are
particular cases of ﬁxed path rules. The proportional rule is not.
To provide a formal description of the ﬁxed path rules we introduce some auxiliary notions.
For each agent set N ∈ N, an N-path is a mapping pN : [0,nγ] −→ RN such that (a) pN is
monotonic (for each z,z′ ∈ [0,nγ], if z ≤ z′ then pN(z) ≤ pN(z′)); and (b) for each z ∈ [0,nγ],
P
i∈N pN
i (z) = z. Let π(pN) be the curve on RN that pN draws when z varies from 0 to nγ. A
ﬁxed path speciﬁes an N-path for each set N ∈ N, with the requirement that the N-paths must
be projectionally consistent.
Fixed path, p. It is a collection {pN}N∈N such that if N ⊆ N′ then π(pN′
)N = π(pN).3
Associated to each ﬁxed path we deﬁned a ﬁxed path rule. The collection of those rules is the
ﬁxed path family.
Fixed path rule for p, Bp: For each e = (N,E,c) ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector





3This notation means the following. Notice that π(p
N′
) and π(p




, respectively. By π(p
N′
)N we denote the projection of π(p
N′
) on the space R
N.
4It is worth noting that in the case of the weighted and non-weighted constrained equal awards rules the
6The ﬁxed path family can be interpreted as follows. For each rule S and for each problem
e = ({i,j},E,c), we deﬁne the awards rate rS(e) as the portion of ith agent’s award enjoyed
by j when none of them is fully granted, i.e., rS(e) =
Sj(e)
Si(e) when Si(e) ≤ ci, Sj(e) ≤ cj, and
Sj(e) ≤ Si(e). For the three aforementioned rules, the awards rates are the followings:
rp(e) =
cj




As we can observe, the awards rate of the ceaα rule (and hence the cea rule) is constant,
independently of both the claims and the estate. For the ﬁxed path family, the awards rate does
not depend on the claims but it may depend on the estate. Which is the advantage? Notice
that when rS is constant it represents how deserving agent i is in relation to agent j. But, even
if some agents are perceived as being more deserving than others, we may desire that such a
degree of merit vary with the size of the resource to allot. Let xi and xj be the awards for agents
i and j when none of them is fully satisﬁed. For the constrained equal awards rule, xi is always
equal to xj, regardless of the estate. For a weighted constrained equal awards rule, xi is always
equal to αi
αjxj, regardless of the estate. For the ﬁxed path rules, the relation between xi and xj
may depend on the estate. For example, we may have that xi = x2
j. Hence, when the amount
to divide is small, agents may receive ”almost” equal awards while when the amount to divide
is large their awards may diﬀer signiﬁcantly.


























Figure 2: Illustration of the path of awards of three rules in the ﬁxed path family.






. Case (c) is








pN(z) = (γ,z − γ) otherwise. All the three rules have in common a ﬁxed path from
(0,0) to Γ = (γ,γ).
parameter λ was an scalar. In this deﬁnition λ
p denotes an n-dimensional point in N-path p
N.







z ∈ [0,2γ] (Case b in Figure 2). The next table shows how the cea, cea(2,1), and Bp rules apply.
Rules (γ = 100)
c E cea cea(2,1) Bp
(30,9) 6 (3,3) (4,2) (5.67,0.32)
(30,9) 24 (15,9) (16,8) (20,4)
(30,9) 28 (19,9) (19,9) (22.80,5.19)
(15,40) 9 (4.5,4.5) (6,3) (8.30,0.69)
(15,40) 24 (12,12) (16,8) (15,9)
3 Two properties. Strong composition down and consistency.
The next property has been widely studied in the claims problems literature. And it is particu-
larly useful when some uncertainty over the estate exists. Let e = (N,E′,c) be the problem to
solve, and let x be the awards vector selected by a rule S for that problem, x = S(e). Imagine
that when estimating the value of the estate, we were too optimistic, and the actual value E
is smaller than expected, E < E′. Now, two claims vectors arise as legitimate demands. The
ﬁrst is the original claims vector c, and the second is the promised awards x. Composition down
requires that, independently of which demands vector we consider, we end up with the same
allocation.5
Composition down: For each e ∈ C and each E′ ∈ R+ such that C > E′ > E, then
S(e) = S(N,E,S(N,E′,c)).
Therefore, composition down stipulates as legitimate demands only two claims vectors, c and
x. That is, in the formulation of the property it is implicitly assumed that, either all the agents
unanimously demand the original claims c, or they unanimously demand the promised awards
x. The claims vector represents not a collective right but a collection of individual rights.
From this perspective, the next property recognizes as legitimate demands also the intermediate
situations, where a consensus on c or x is not required. Now, let T ⊆ N be a subset of the
agents in N. Let (xT,cN T) be the vector of claims where the demands of agents in T is the
promised awards x and agents not in T is the original claims c. In the spirit of composition
down, strong composition down requires that we end up with the same allocation independently
of which demands we consider, x, c or (xT,cN T) for any T ⊆ N.
Strong composition down: For each e ∈ C, each E′ ∈ R+ such that C > E′ > E, and each
T ⊆ N, then S(e) = S(N,E,(ST(N,E′,c),cN T)).
Strong composition down looks very demanding. But, actually, many rules satisfy this property.
5This property was formulated by Moulin (2000).
8Among them, the constrained and weighted constrained equal awards rules (the proportional
rule, however, does not). Any ﬁxed path rule also fulﬁls strong composition down.
Now let us consider a procedural property related to changes in the agent set. Suppose that,
after solving a problem, some agents leave with their awards. The remaining agents re-valuate
how to allocate the remaining estate among them. Consistency requires that each of these agents
should receive the amount she received before the re-valuation.6.




Let us consider a rule S that, when N = {1,2,3} coincides with the constrained equal awards,
and when N = {1,2} coincides with the dictatorial rule that favors agent 1 (as the limit case of
a weighted constrained equal awards rule). In comparing agent 1 with agent 2, this rule is quite
fair for agent 2 when agent 3 is present, but extremely unfair when agent 3 is not. Consistency
avoids this type of drawback. All the rules presented in the previous section, as they are deﬁned
there, are consistent.
Now we present our main result. It identiﬁes the family of rules that satisfy strong composition
down and consistency together. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. The ﬁxed path rules are the only rules satisfying strong composition down and
consistency together.
4 Some extensions
We explore in this section some other axioms, and we show how they are combined with strong
composition down and consistency.
The ﬁrst property stipulates that problems in which the claims and estate are small should be
treated similarly to problems where the estate and claims are large. Although this criterion
cannot be applied always, it is very desirable in many situations. Homogeneity requires that, if
estate and claims are multiplied by the same positive amount, so the awards vector is.
Homogeneity. For each e = (N,E,c) ∈ C and each β ∈ R+, S(N,βE,βc) = βS(N,E,c).
The weighted constrained equal awards rules are homogenous. Regarding the ﬁxed path rules,
some satisfy homogeneity and others do not.
The next property, composition up, represents the dual idea of composition down, and it is
equally useful. Let e = (N,E′,c) be a problem to solve, and let x be the solution of the rule S
for that problem, x = S(e). Imagine that when estimating the value of the estate, we were too
pessimistic, and the actual value E is greater than expected, E > E′. Now two possibilities are
6This property has been widely studied. Thomson (1998) is a survey.
9open. One is to solve the problem with the revised estate, S(N,E,c). The other is to assign
the awards vector x ﬁrst, and then to allocate the remaining estate (E −E′), after reducing the
claims by the amounts just given, c−x. Composition up says that both ways result in the same
awards.7
Composition up. For each e ∈ C and each E′ ∈ R+ such that E′ < E, then S(e) = x +
S(N,E − E′,c − x), where x = S(N,E′,c).
The weighted constrained equal awards rules satisfy composition up. Regarding the ﬁxed path
rules, some satisfy the property while others do not.
By far, one of the most well-known results in claims problems literature is due to Moulin (2000).
In its main result, that we reproduce below, the author characterizes the family of rules that
satisfy composition down, composition up, homogeneity, and consistency together. Such a family
is the so-called family M and it contains a wide variety of rules. Namely, the proportional, the
weighted constrained equal awards, the weighted constrained equals losses, dictatorial rules,...
and combinations of them.8 Before deﬁning the family M, let us introduce the D rules.
Family D. For |N| = 2. Each member of the family is deﬁned as follows. Awards space is
partitioned into cones; each non-degenerate cone is spanned by a homothetic family of piece-
wise linear curves in two pieces, a segment containing the origin and contained in one of the
boundary rays of the cone (the ”ﬁrst ray”) and a half-line parallel to the other boundary ray
(the ”second ray”). (Cones can be degenerate, that is, can be rays.) For each claims vector, the
path of awards of the rule is obtained by identifying the cone to which the claims vector belongs
and the curve in the cone passing through it. The path is the restriction of the curve to the box
having the origin and the claims vector as opposite vertices and whose sides are parallel to the
axes.
Family M. Each member of the family is deﬁned as follows. The population of potential
claimants is partitioned into priority classes; for each two-agent class, a rule in the family D
is speciﬁed; to each class with three or more claimants, one of the following labels is attached:
”proportional”, or ”constrained equal awards”, or ”constrained equal losses”, and in each of
the last two cases, a positive weight is speciﬁed for each claimant in the class. To solve each
problem, we ﬁrst identify the partition of the set of claimants actually present induced by the
reference partition. The elements of this partition are handled in succession. For each class
induced from a two-agent reference class, the rule in D speciﬁed for that class is applied; for
each class induced from a three-or-more claimants reference class, the proportional, or weighted
constrained equal awards, or weighted constrained equal losses rule is applied, according to the
label attached to the class, with weights proportional to the weights that have been assigned to
the agents who are present.
7This property was formulated by Young (1988).
8In order to avoid all the detailed technicalities needed to formally deﬁne the M rule (see Moulin (2000)) we
reproduce the deﬁnition as in Thomson (2003).
10Theorem 4.1 (Moulin (2000)). A rule satisﬁes composition down, composition up, homogeneity,
and consistency if and only if it is a M-rule.
The question that arises is the following. Which are the implications of substituting composition
down for strong composition down in Theorem 4.1? The answer is our next result. It states that
only the ceaα rules survive. That is, these are the only rules that satisfy strong composition
down, composition up, homogeneity, and consistency together. Therefore, by introducing strong
composition down, we separate the weighted constrained equal awards rules from all those
characterized in Theorem 4.1. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 4.2. The weighted constrained equal wards rules are the only rules satisfying
(a) Strong composition down, composition up, and consistency together.
(b) Strong composition down, homogeneity, and consistency together.
Furthermore, as Theorem 4.2 suggests, (a) homogeneity can be obtained as a consequence of
strong composition down, composition up, and consistency; and (b) composition up can be
obtained as a consequence of strong composition down, homogeneity, and consistency.
Finally, we introduce a minimal requirement of fairness. Equal treatment of equals is very mild
in this sense, and it simply requires equal agents to be treated equally. That is, agents with
equals claims should receive equal awards.
Equal treatment of equals. For each e ∈ C and each {i,j} ⊆ N, if ci = cj then Si(e) = Sj(e).
By adding this property to the axioms of Theorem 3.1, we obtain a new characterization of the
constrained equal awards rule.
Corollary 4.1. The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of
equals, strong composition down, and consistency together.
Most of the characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule provided in the existing
literature use three types of properties, one of each type. First, those involving impartiality
principles, as it is the case of equal treatment of equals. Second, stability with respect to changes
in the estate, as it is the case of composition down, strong composition down, or composition up.
Finally, the third type of properties, and the most controversial one, refers to very particular
value judgements. As an illustration, Herrero and Villar (2001) contains two examples of these
properties, conditional full compensation and exemption, where agents with small claims are
deliberately protected. The last corollary avoids the latter type of principles, imposing only
impartiality and stability.
115 Final remarks
In this work we have introduced the property of strong composition down as a revision of compo-
sition down. We have also described the ﬁxed path rules for claims problems as a generalization
of the weighted constrained equal awards family. Strong composition down and consistency
characterize the ﬁxed path family. Moreover, by adding homogeneity or composition up, we
end up with the weighted constrained equal awards family. And, by adding equal treatment
of equals, we end up with the constrained equal awards rule. Interestingly, strong composition
down is enough to separate the ceaα rules in Moulin (2000)
For the present paper, we have implicitly considered rules from the point of view of gains.
Nevertheless, it is quite common in the literature to make the dual analysis as well. Two rules
are dual if one of them assigns awards in the same way the other one assigns losses. The dual
of the constrained equal awards and weighted constrained equal awards rules are the so-called
constrained equal losses and weighted constrained equal losses rules, respectively.9 Similarly, we
may deﬁne the dual of the ﬁxed path family. The notion of duality applies to the properties
as well. Two properties are dual if whenever a rule satisﬁes one of the properties, the dual of
the rule satisﬁes the other property. Homogeneity and equal treatment of equals are self-dual
(the dual property is itself), while the dual of composition down is composition up. Again,
we may consider the dual property of strong composition down, which goes along the lines of
composition up in the same way strong composition down does with respect to composition
down. In view of Theorem 3.1, and using the characterization-by-duality result in Herrero and
Villar (2001), the dual of strong composition down and consistency characterize the dual of the
ﬁxed path family.
In considering composition down and strong composition down together with their dual proper-
ties, more things can be said. Only the serial dictatorial rules satisfy strong composition down
and strong composition up together.
9The reader is referred to Thomson (2003) for a formal description of both.
12Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix is devoted to the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 4.2, preceded by some deﬁnitions
and technical results.
Resource monotonicity stipulates that no agent should be penalized as a consequence of an
increase in the estate.
Resource monotonicity. For each (N,E,c) ∈ C, if E′ > E then S(N,E′,c) ≥ S(N,E,c).
Let us consider a problem and an awards vector for it with the following feature. For each
two-agent subset of the agents involved, the rule chooses the restriction of that vector for the as-
sociated reduced problem to this agent subset. Converse consistency requires that the allocation
should be the one selected by the rule for the original problem.10
Let c.con(e;S) ≡ {x ∈ RN
+ :
P




Converse consistency. For each e ∈ C, c.con(e;S)  = φ, and if x ∈ c.con(e;S), then x = S(e).
Lemma 5.1 (Elevator Lemma, Thomson (1998)). If a rule S is consistent and coincides with
a conversely consistent rule S′ in the two-agent case, then it coincides with S′ in general.
Proposition 5.1 (Chun (1999)). Resource monotonicity and consistency together imply con-
verse consistency.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
It is not diﬃcult to check that any ﬁxed path rule satisﬁes strong composition down and con-
sistency. It is also straightforward that strong composition down implies composition down and
the latter resource monotonicity. Therefore, by Proposition 5.1, any ﬁxed path rule is converse
consistent. Let S be a rule fulﬁlling strong composition down and consistency. We deﬁne the
N-path as the path of awards of S for claims vector ΓN when the estate varies from 0 to nγ. Let
p be the ﬁxed path once we consider the N-paths for all N ∈ N, which is well deﬁned because
S is consistent. We show that S = Bp. By the Elevator Lemma, it is enough to prove the result
in the two-agent case. Let N = {i,j} and c ∈ R{i,j} such that ci ≤ cj. Let y ∈ p(Γ) = pN be a
vector such that yi = ci and yj < cj. And let z ∈ p(Γ) be a vector such that zj = cj and zi > ci.
We distinguish several cases.
Case 1. If c ∈ p(Γ). Let E ∈ [0,
P
i∈N ci]. Note that, since c ∈ p(Γ), S(N,
P
i∈N ci,Γ) = c
by deﬁnition of a path of awards. Then S(N,E,c) = S(N,E,S(
P
i∈N ci,Γ)). By strong
composition down, S(N,E,S(
P
i∈N ci,Γ)) = S(N,E,Γ) = Bp(N,E,Γ) = Bp(N,E,c).
Therefore, S(N,E,c) = Bp(N,E,c).
10This property was formulated by Chun (1999).
13Case 2. If c / ∈ p(Γ) and E ≤
P
i∈N yi. By Case 1, S(N,
P
i∈N yi,z) = Bp(N,
P
i∈N yi,z) = y.















= S(N,E,c). Since z ∈ p(Γ), by Case
1, we know that S(N,E,z) = Bp(N,E,z) = Bp(N,E,c). Therefore, S(N,E,c) =
Bp(N,E,c).
Case 3. If c / ∈ p(Γ) and E >
P
i∈N yi. Note that, on the one hand, by strong composition down,
S(
P
i∈N yi,c) = S(
P





i∈N yi,c) = y. Then, c ≥ S(E,c) ≥ y. Therefore, S(E,c) = Bp(E,c).
Therefore, S and Bp coincide in the two-agent case, and thus they do so in general.










































Figure 3: Illustration of the proof for the two-agent case. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
(c) Case 3.
14Remark 5.1. The proportional rule satisﬁes consistency but violates strong composition down.
A rule satisfying strong composition down but not consistency can be deﬁned as follows.
S(e) =
(
cea(2,1)(e) if N = {1,2}
cea(e) otherwise
The properties that characterize the ﬁxed path family are, therefore, independent.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
(a) The weighted constrained equal awards rules trivially fulﬁl the three properties. We only
need to prove the converse for the two-agent case, N = {i,j}, since, in application of
the Elevator Lemma, it will be extended to the general case. Let S be a rule satisfying
strong composition down, composition up, and consistency. By Theorem 3.1, S is a ﬁxed
path rule; and then it is completely described by its paths. Let α ∈ R2 be the point
where the path p(Γ) reaches the square determined the four vertices (0,0), (0,γ), (γ,0)
and (γ,γ) = Γ (see Figure 4). Without loss of generality, we assume that αj = γ. We
probe that if z ∈ p(Γ) then α− z ∈ p(Γ), which implies that the path of awards from 0 to
α is a straight line. For any z,z′ ∈ R2, let zz′ denotes the segment joining z and z′. We
distinguish several cases.
Case 1. If p(Γ) is always above the segment 0α (see Figure 4,(a)). Let z ∈ p(Γ), and so
S(N,zi + zj,α) = z. There exists E ∈ R++ such that S(N,E,α − z) = (E − αj +
zj,αj − zj) and E − αj + zj < αi − zi. By composition up,
S(N,E + (zi + zj),α) = S(N,zi + zj,α) + S(N,E,α − z)
= (zi,zj) + (E − αj + zj,αj − zj)
= (E + zi + zj − αj,αj)
= (E + zi + zj − γ,γ)
Since we imposed that E − γ + zj < αi − zi, then E + zi + zj − γ < αi. This is a
contradiction with the deﬁnition of α.
Case 2. If p(Γ) is sometimes above and sometimes below the segment 0α (see Figure 4,
(b)). Without loss of generality let us suppose that it is above ﬁrstly (a similar
argument can be applied if it is starts from below). Let z ∈ p(Γ) be the point where
p(Γ) ﬁrstly crosses the segment 0α. By composition up we have that
S(N,E + zi + zj,α) = S(N,zi + zj,α) + S(N,E,α − z)
= z + S(N,E,α − z)
Note that S(N,E,α−z) is above 0α, and so is S(N,E+zi+zj,α). This is contradicts
the deﬁnition of z.
15Case 3. If p(Γ) is always below the segment 0α and there exists a point β as in Figure 4,
(c). Using composition up, we get that for each E ∈ [βi + βj,2γ]
S(N,E,Γ) = S(N,βi + βj,Γ) + S(N,E − (βi + βj),Γ − β)
= β + S(N,E − (βi + βj),Γ − β)
Then, S(N,E − (βi + βj),Γ − β) = S(N,E,Γ) − β for all E ∈ [βi + βj,2γ]. That
means that the path of awards of S for Γ − β is as in Figure 4. But this contradicts
what a ﬁxed path rule is.
Case 4. Finally, we will show that the point β of the previous Case always exists (see
Figure 4, (d)). Suppose that it does not. Let z ∈ p(Γ), z = S(N,zi + zj,α). For all
E ∈ (zi + zj,αi + αj), by composition up, we have that
S(N,E,α) = S(N,zi + zj,α) + S(N,E − (zi + zj),α − z)
= z + S(N,E − (zi + zj),α − z)
It is not diﬃcult to check that α − z is above the segment 0α. Then, there exits
E′ ∈ (zi + zj,αi + αj) such that
S(N,E′ − (zi + zj),α − z) = (αi − zi,E′ − (zi + zj) − (αi + αj)).
Therefore,
S(N,E′,α) = z + S(N,E − (zi + zj),α − z)
= (zi,zj) + (αi − zi,E′ − (zi + zj) − (αi − zi))
= (αi,E′ − αi)
But we can then deﬁne β as β = (αi,E′ − αi).
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
(b) This proof comes from Thomson (2006). He characterizes the set of homogeneous rules.
By using their result it is not diﬃcult to check that the only homogeneous rules within
the ﬁxed path family are the weighted constrained equal awards rules. Alternatively, one
may use an argument similar to Case (a) to show that the ﬁxed path should be like the
weighted constrained equal awards rules.
Proof of Corollary 4.1.
By Theorem 3.1 is enough to show that the constrained equal awards rule is the unique ﬁxed
path rule satisfying equal treatment of equals. A rule satisﬁes equal treatment of equals if and
only if the diagonal is its path of awards vector Γ, that is, if (λ,...,λ) ∈ pN for all λ ≤ γ.































Figure 4: Illustration of the proof for the two-agent case. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
(c) Case 3. (d) Case 4.
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